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 COMMENTS ON LANDES AND POSNER:
 A POSITIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
 OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
 PATRICIA M. DANZON*
 LANDEs and Posner have certainly delivered on their promise to give us
 a provocative paper. Their contention is that "the principal doctrines of
 products liability law are consistent with the hypothesis that the common
 law is best understood as an endeavor (which need not be conscious) to
 promote economic efficiency" in the sense in which they use that term.1
 Their definition of economic efficiency involves providing efficient incen-
 tives for injury prevention and some informal concern for the costs of
 transacting and litigation, but no concern for efficient bearing of risk. If
 their conclusions were widely held, we probably would not be here today.
 Although their ingenuity is impressive, I find their conclusions less than
 compelling. My objections fall into three categories. The first is meth-
 odological. The second is the treatment of information costs. I think they
 overstate the information problem facing consumers and underestimate
 the information problems created for courts, producers, and insurers, by
 the rules designed to solve the consumer information problem. Third,
 even if they had shown that the common law tends to be efficient by their
 criterion of efficiency, I would argue that this criterion is too narrowly
 defined. Because it excludes costs of risk bearing, it cannot be used either
 as the basis of normative statements about what courts should do, if the
 goal is efficiency, or for positive statements about how the courts would
 behave if they were moved to act efficiently. Let me now discuss each of
 these issues in some detail.
 * Associate Professor of Health Care Systems and Insurance, Wharton School, Univer-
 sity of Pennsylvania.
 ' William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products
 Liability, in this issue, at 535.
 [Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XIV (December 1985)]
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 I. METHODOLOGY
 Although Landes and Posner start with a formal model and then discuss
 empirical evidence, this is no strict application of the paradigm of
 scientific method, which would have one posit a theory, derive hypoth-
 eses, and then test the resulting predictions. The formal model, with
 perfect information and zero contracting costs, implies that relying on
 private contract is the efficient solution. To justify the overruling of con-
 tract by strict liability, Landes and Posner invoke imperfect information
 of consumers and high contracting costs. Granted, these costs exist. But
 giving up contract also entails costs-the costs of imposing uniform qual-
 ity standards and uniform compensation on consumers who are presum-
 ably heterogeneous in their capacity for care and preferences for risk. So
 while information costs are necessary to undermine the case for contract,
 they are not sufficient to guarantee that tort is the more efficient alterna-
 tive. It is an empirical question that cannot be resolved simply by appeal
 to intuition.
 Assuming that the theory had been used to derive a set of empirically
 refutable hypotheses, scientific method would then have one examine a
 randomly selected set of rulings to test for conformity to the theoretical
 predictions. But the set of doctrines Landes and Posner examine is
 neither the full universe nor a random sample, but a carefully selected
 subset. So even if their inference is correct that each of the rules they
 examine is individually efficient, this mode of analysis cannot support the
 broader claim for the efficiency of the common-law process in general.
 To be fair, Landes and Posner readily acknowledge that there may be
 many individual rulings that violate efficiency, and they list several
 specific examples that they so far find hard to rationalize. Of course, the
 force of my objections diminishes in direct proportion to the extent of
 their claims. If they are merely claiming that some decisions or rules have
 some prima facie rationality grounded in incentives for injury prevention,
 that is irrefutable, noncontroversial, and much less interesting. Surely
 they are claiming much more, if theirs is to be called the economic theory
 of common law. The implicit claim is that the dominant thrust of the
 law-however measured-is efficient. But in that case, how much devia-
 tion is tolerable before the underlying hypothesis of efficiency is to be
 rejected? How do we distinguish between the hypothesis that the com-
 mon law is basically efficient, with minor aberrations, and the alternative
 hypothesis that it is basically inefficient, with minor pockets of efficiency?
 Thus unless their claim for the efficiency of common law is quite general,
 it is not falsifiable and is therefore empty. But if their claim is more
 general, then their methodology does not sustain it. The issue has a dy-
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 namic as well as a static dimension. Let us grant for the sake of argument
 that there is an evolution over time of the common law toward efficiency.
 How much delay is acceptable before we return a verdict of inefficiency
 and at least consider the alternatives of contractual freedom or statutory
 intervention?
 The basic problem extends beyond this particular paper by Landes and
 Posner. Quite simply, we have today no quantifiable benchmark of a
 "workably efficient" common-law set of rules. Yet without this measure
 we have no way of arbitrating between the competing claims of Landes
 and Posner that product liability is efficient and of others among us who
 are more skeptical. Of course, this point is on the one hand quite funda-
 mental and on the other hand rather picky, unless I have some such
 measure to propose, which I do not. So the rest of my comments will
 proceed on their terms, offering admittedly nonrigorous, qualitative argu-
 ments and empirical observations against some of their conclusions, with-
 out offering a clear cut refutation.
 First, let me test the generalizability of some of their arguments.
 Landes and Posner rationalize the demise of privity in the past on the
 grounds that "advances in scientific knowledge have made it easier to
 ascertain the point in the chain of distribution at which a product . . .
 became defective."2 But that reasoning should be reversible. It should
 argue for the restitution of privity for toxic chemicals with long latent side
 effects, such as asbestos, where it is very difficult to assign responsibility
 among numerous contributing parties. Instead, producer liability con-
 tinues to expand, regardless of potential inefficiencies from erroneous
 attribution of cause, inefficient distribution of risk, or staggering transac-
 tion costs. The results in the toxics area thus seem to contradict a general
 testable implication of the Landes and Posner hypothesis.
 II. THE COSTS OF INFORMATION
 The cornerstone of their defense of strict liability, against the prima
 facie more efficient alternative of contractual freedom, is the cost of infor-
 mation about product hazards to consumers. The argument is not so much
 inability to process information about low probability events as lack of
 incentive. For example, "[i]t is out of the question that [the consumer]
 should minutely inspect each soda bottle on the one in a million chance
 that it contains mouse parts."3
 But it is not so obvious that the costs of obtaining information so clearly
 2 Id. at 549.
 3 Id. at 555.
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 outweigh the benefits. For risks that are reasonably uniform for all con-
 sumers, as in the mouse parts or exploding cigars examples, the manufac-
 turer or some consumer surrogate such as Consumer Reports could pre-
 sumably reduce to trivial levels the costs of obtaining information about
 the probability of injury, simply by publishing warnings. The issue is then
 the incentive to read and assimilate such warnings. But this depends not
 only on the probability of an injury for a single bottle of coke, but on the
 total expected value of the information. Let us allow that the odds of an
 explosion are one in a million, that the damages if an injury occurs are
 (conservatively) $1 million, that the average coke consumer drinks one
 bottle daily, and that technology changes each year, such that information
 becomes obsolete after a year. With these parameters, the value of infor-
 mation (ignoring discounting) is $365, which is surely sufficient to out-
 weigh the time costs required to read the warning on a coke bottle once.
 Thus for many common consumer products, repeat purchase undermines
 the argument that it is not rational for consumers to process information
 about low-probability events. A similar logic applies in the case of con-
 sumer durables, which are frequently used although less frequently pur-
 chased.
 The argument applies a fortiori in the case of producer goods, where the
 employer is often not only a repeat purchaser but also a large-volume
 user. The Landes-Posner logic would thus seem to support a negligence
 rule or upholding of contractual disclaimers at least for producer goods. A
 large number of product liability claims are employer claims for
 indemnification for workers' compensation losses. It is widely-and to
 me plausibly-alleged that this indemnification of employers through
 product liability, regardless of employer negligence, undermines em-
 ployer incentives for injury prevention when their precautionary mea-
 sures may be essential for the efficient production of care. Thus the case
 against contractual disclaimers, in favor of strict liability in tort, seems
 particularly uncompelling in the quantitatively important context of pro-
 ducer goods.
 But returning to consumer goods, even if the argument that consumers
 lack incentives to process information were convincing in principle, it is
 belied by the evidence George Priest has assembled on the detailed con-
 tent of product warranties.4 He shows that the structure of product war-
 ranty clauses is quite consistent with the hypothesis that warranties are
 designed to encourage efficient investment in care, and is inconsistent
 4 George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L. J. 1297
 (1981).
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 with the alternative hypothesis that warranties represent manufacturer
 exploitation of consumer ignorance. So this evidence from warranties
 seems squarely in conflict with the Landes-Posner argument that consum-
 ers will not choose to become informed about product risks.
 III. THE DEFINITION OF EFFICIENCY
 The formal model defines efficiency solely in terms of minimizing the
 costs of injuries and of injury prevention. Consumers and producers are
 assumed to be risk neutral. Courts are presumed to define the due care
 standards with perfect and perfectly known accuracy. The only informa-
 tion costs recognized are those of consumers in assessing injury risk. Of
 course simplification is necessary to build models, but the price here is
 too high, for Landes and Posner's model is no longer able to explain the
 relevant evidence.
 First, the assumption of perfect information and hence perfect adjudi-
 cation by the courts is clearly false. The unpredictable nature of tort rules
 and decisions, with random and perhaps systematic deviations from
 efficient due care standards, is obviously a major source of dissatisfaction
 with the current tort system.
 There is an accumulating body of literature showing how variability in
 court decisions undermines the potential efficiency of the tort system as a
 signal for deterrence. It leads to an extensive demand for insurance even
 under a negligence rule, where in theory no such demand for insurance
 should exist. Because insurers cannot costlessly monitor care, such insur-
 ance is not fully experience rated, as is required for the appropriate trans-
 mission of incentives.
 Second, the assumption of risk neutrality is clearly refuted by the de-
 mand for insurance. The risk neutrality assumption would be sustainable,
 if liability and first party insurance were universally available at actuar-
 ially fair prices. Then all parties would be fully insured and, at the margin,
 would be risk neutral. That is far from the case. For liability insurance,
 the loading charge is anywhere between 30 percent and 100 percent,
 depending on how one defines the benefits received. Part of this cost
 stems from the volatility of legal rules, which, as I have argued elsewhere,
 create nondiversifiable risk.5 In the case of first-party health and disability
 insurance, the widespread provision through employment-based group
 programs, written on a year-at-a-time basis, is adequate for most acute
 problems, but seriously inadequate for the victim of a disabling injury
 5 Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance
 Markets, 13 J. Legal Stud. 3 (1984).
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 who becomes identifiable as a high risk and hence unemployable and
 uninsurable. With this institutional framework, risk and the bearing of
 risk entail costs that are too large to be ignored.
 Because it omits risk, the Landes-Posner analysis is insufficient for
 making normative statements about efficient liability rules. And to the
 extent their model ignores a factor that the courts have apparently taken
 seriously, their model loses its predictive power. It seems clear that allo-
 cation of risk has been a major factor in the evolution of product liability
 law. It is also clear that concern over the cost of liability insurance is a
 major factor driving the demand for tort reform, both in medical malprac-
 tice and in product liability. It can be argued that the costs of insurance
 are currently unnecessarily high because the courts have, misguidedly,
 used the tort system as a vehicle for social insurance.
 Finally, I would like to comment on their interesting empirical finding
 that the early abandonment of the privity doctrine is significantly cor-
 related with the degree of urbanization in a state. They interpret this
 result as evidence that the shift to manufacturer liability is an efficient
 response to the growing complexity of products and relative disadvantage
 of consumers in taking care. Thus urbanization is interpreted as a mea-
 sure of product complexity. In my analysis of the determinants of the
 frequency and severity of medical malpractice claims, I found that urbani-
 zation was the single most powerful predictor of both frequency and
 severity, after controlling for other obvious characteristics of urban areas,
 such as density of physicians and lawyers per capita.6 Together these
 pieces of evidence suggest that urban courts have consistently led the
 movement toward expanded protection of consumers. Whether this is so
 because the costs of care are higher to urban consumers-the Landes-
 Posner hypothesis-or because of self-selection of "liberal" people to
 urban areas, or because urban consumers have greater need of market
 insurance, as family ties tend to break down in urban areas, or for any
 other reason, is an interesting topic that requires further research.
 6 Patricia Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J. Law
 & Econ. 115 (1984).
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